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This is the fourth volume of Equality and Justice, a six-volume collection of the most important 
articles of the twentieth century on the topic of justice and equality. This volume and the second 
part of Volume 5: Social Contract and the Currency of Justice address the question of what kinds 
of good are relevant for justice (welfare, initial opportunity for welfare, resources, capabilities, 
etc.) Other volumes address the following issues: (1) the concept of justice, (2) whether justice is 
primarily a demand on individuals or on societies, and (3) the relative merits of conceptions of 
justice based on equality, on priority for those who have less, and on ensuring that everyone has 
a basic minimum, of the relevant goods (Volume 1); whether justice requires equality of some 
sort (Volume 2); the question of who (animals, members of other societies, future people, etc.) is 
owed justice (Volume 3); contractarian conceptions of justice (part of Volume 5); and desert and 
entitlement conceptions of justice (Volume 6). 
Justice is concerned with the distribution of goods of some sort, but there is great 
disagreement about what the relevant goods are. This debate has largely taken place within the 
context of egalitarian theory (what should be equalized?), but the issue is a general issue of 
justice (what kinds of things is justice concerned with?). 
One view is that justice is concerned with the distribution of well-being (quality of life). 
Well-being can be understood as happiness, preference satisfaction, or some more objective 
conception of quality of life (e.g., one that would include knowledge or friendship independently 
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of their value for happiness).  
 There are, of course, many competitors to the well-being view. One defended by 
libertarians is that justice is concerned with certain formal freedoms (e.g., personal security, 
freedom of movement, association, etc.). A second view—one defended by Elizabeth 
Anderson—is that justice is concerned with those capabilities that are necessary to function as a 
free and equal citizen. Social status (e.g., respect from fellow citizens) is on this view an 
important good. A third view—one defended by John Rawls—is that justice is concerned with 
the distribution of primary goods. These are resources that any rational individual would want 
more of (such as opportunities, wealth, and income). A fourth view—one defended by Ronald 
Dworkin—is that justice is concerned with external resources, understood as the competitive 
value (based on supply and demand) of the non-personal resources that one owns. This does not 
include personal resources (one’s capacities), although Dworkin believes that an adjustment is 
needed to reflect personal resources as well (via a hypothetical insurance mechanism). A fifth 
view—one defended by Amartya Sen—is that justice is concerned with (personal) capabilities, 
which are the effective abilities of individuals to function (to do things as well as to be happy). 
Sen rightly insists that primary goods and non-personal resources fail to take in account what an 
individual is able to do with those things, which is, after all, of central importance. One problem 
with appealing to capabilities, however, concerns the assessment of the relative importance of 
the very large number of capabilities that individuals could have. Is the capability to see well 
more important (in a given context) than the capability to move about easily? How would this 
question be answered? One way of answering this question—one advocated by capability 
theorist, Martha Nussbaum—is to appeal to certain basic facts of human nature. 
 Well-being is arguably the most natural candidate for the good with justice is concerned. 
For it clearly matters for its own sake. It is, however, vulnerable to powerful objections, at least 
3 
if justice requires equality: First, it leaves little room for incentives and the benefits increased 
productivity that they could bring. Second, it leaves no room for individuals being accountable 
for their past choices. Suppose that everyone starts with equal well-being and effectively equal 
opportunities, and then some wisely choose to invest in their future while others unwisely choose 
not to. Several years later those who chose wisely are very well off, while those who chose 
unwisely are poorly off. Equality of well-being requires that resources be transferred from those 
who are well off to those who are poorly off, but this seems unjust. Why should those who chose 
wisely have to share their resources with those who chose unwisely? 
 This objection—raised most forcefully by Ronald Dworkin in his seminal “Equality of 
What” articles—has led many to hold that justice is concerned with the distribution of goods 
other than with well-being. This inference seems mistaken for two reasons. First, focusing on 
resources, for example, does not automatically solve the problem. Equality (or other pattern) of 
resources at each time (as opposed to initially) also requires transferring resources from those 
who chose wisely to those who didn’t. Second, the problem can be avoided by holding that 
justice requires equality of initial opportunities for well-being rather than equality of well-being 
at each point in time. Individuals, that is, should have effectively equal opportunities for a good 
life, but what they make of those opportunities is not a matter of concern for justice. This point is 
independent of whether the relevant outcome good is well-being, resources, or something else. In 
either case, many would argue, justice is concerned with the distribution of the opportunities for 
the good, and not with the good itself. 
 One way, then, that a theory of justice (whether based on well-being or other goods) can 
hold agents accountable for their choices is by being concerned with initial opportunities for 
well-being rather than outcome well-being. A second, and much more popular, way of leaving 
room for agent-accountability is by holding that justice is concerned only with the distribution of 
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advantages from brute luck, where something is a matter of brute luck for an agent if she should 
not reasonably have deliberately influenced its occurrence. One’s initial opportunities are, of 
course, a matter of brute luck, but so are unforeseeable lightening strikes later in life. Winning 
the lottery, on the other hand, is typically not a matter of brute luck. Dworkin and other authors 
have argued that justice is concerned with brute luck advantage generally (including later adult 
brute luck) and not merely with the brute luck advantages of one’s initial opportunities. 
 A different reason for holding that justice is concerned with goods other than well-being 
is the claim that individuals are accountable for their tastes, preferences, or capacity to generate 
well-being from resources. Justice is not, it is claimed, concerned with such matters. Now, to the 
extent that the tastes of individuals are modifiable by those individuals, it may well be that 
individuals are, to that extent, accountable for their tastes. A person who deliberately develops 
expensive tastes (e.g., who can no longer be happy if she is not drinking very expensive wine) is 
indeed accountable for that development, and justice is not concerned with inequalities in well-
being due to such development. The opportunity for well-being view agrees with this. Matters 
are different, however, for the tastes that the individual started with or that were imposed by 
external forces. Many would argue that an individual who is born with an expensive taste that is 
not easily alterable (e.g., a person who can be happy only with expensive medications) is not 
accountable for the presence of those expensive tastes. It would be unjust, many would argue, to 
give the same external resources to this individual as to a similar individual who began life 
without this expensive taste. Thus, accountability for one’s tastes may not require abandoning 
the well-being view. On the other hand, the well-being view holds that individuals born with less 
expensive tastes are entitled to fewer resources, and many object to this feature. 
 Independently of whether justice is concerned with the distribution of well-being, initial 
opportunity for well-being, brute luck well-being, resources (of some specified sort), initial 
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opportunity for resources, or brute luck resources, there is a further issue. Is justice concerned 
with these items as such, or only with the component thereof that was produced by our agency—
as opposed to nature. Some—Thomas Nagel, for example—have argued that it is only the latter. 
Thus, for example, justice, it is argued, is concerned with the distribution of life prospects (of the 
relevant sort) produced by social institutions (e.g., discrimination on the basis of sex or race), but 
it is not concerned with the impact on this distribution of natural forces (e.g., the distribution of 
genes in an age in which there is no social manipulation of this distribution). On this view, 
justice is concerned only with the contribution of our agency to the distribution of goods—and 
not with the natural distribution thereof. 
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